

Millennial Generation Conception about Islamophobic, De-radicalization and Communication Process Based on Multicultural Education: A Phenomenography Study

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Abstract: Islamophobic is a mind-set of fear about everything about Islam. The countenance of Islam as '*rahmatan lil alamin*' (bringing peace to all people), is affected by acts of violence and terror that are often displayed by a group of radical Muslims. The purpose of this research is to find out how the description of the understanding of Islamophobic among Christians, especially the millennial generation in Indonesia. It is related to the countenance of violence that is often done by some Muslims who in fact do not reflect the overall attitude of Islamic Teachings in Indonesia. Through phenomenography study the data was collected from all interviewees, related to certain conceptions or conceptions expressed by each individual. Data collection was carried out by structured interviews with 21 selected research subjects. The characteristics of the informants are those who are a generation of Christian millennial who have easy access to information. The findings of this study propose that Islamophobic is conceptualized as a form of fear. It is because of the countenance of Islam which is portrayed as full of violence, radical acts, discriminatory, hatred and raises fear among non-Islamic Followers. The attempt to de-radicalize was conceived successfully by the government because it was considered the right way to reduce feelings of fear and anxiety among non-Muslims. In addition, through the process of communication and multicultural education, it is expected to bridging the meeting of different views and is very relevant for diversity in Indonesia.

Keywords: *Conception of Islamophobic, De-radicalization, Multicultural, Phenomenography, Millennial Generation*

Abstrak: Islamphobia adalah sikap ketakutan tentang segala sesuatu tentang Islam. Wajah Islam yang '*rahmatan lil alamin*' (membawa damai bagi semua orang), tercederai dengan aksi kekerasan dan terror yang sering ditampilkan oleh sekelompok orang Islam yang beraliran radikal. Tujuan riset ini adalah untuk mengetahui bagaimana gambaran pemahaman Islamphobia di kalangan umat Kristiani khususnya generasi milenial di Indonesia terkait wajah kekerasan yang sering ditampilkan oleh sebagian umat Islam yang sejatinya tidak mencerminkan sikap secara keseluruhan umat Islam di Indonesia. Melalui metode studi phenomenography dimana fokus penelitian adalah berbagai konsepsi yang dikumpulkan dari semua yang diwawancarai, terkait konsepsi tertentu atau konsepsi yang diungkapkan oleh setiap individu.. koleksi data dilakukan dengan wawancara terstruktur kepada 21 subyek penelitian terpilih. Karakteristik informan, adalah mereka generasi mileneal Kristen yang secara pengetahuan mudah memperoleh akses informasi. Temuan penelitian ini menyebutkan bahwa islamphobia dikonsepsi sebagai bentuk ketakutan karena wajah islam ditampilkan penuh kekerasan, tindakan radikal, diskriminatif, kebencian serta memunculkan ketakutan di kalangan mereka yang tidak sepaham. Upaya deradikalisasi dikonsepsikan

berhasil dilakukan pemerintah karena dianggap cara yang tepat untuk mereduksi perasaan takut dan cemas di kalangan non muslim. Selain itu melalui proses komunikasi dan pendidikan multikultur, dianggap mampu menjembatani perjumpaan pandangan yang berbeda dan sangat relevan untuk Indonesia yang plural.


Kata Kunci: *konsepsi islamophobia, deradikalisasi, multikultur, phenomenograph, generasi milenial*

Introduction

That Sunday morning (5/13/2018), hands felt shaking and mouth is choked. Just after the Sunday morning service was over, word broke out that several churches in Surabaya, the second largest city in Indonesia, were detonated by suicide bombings. It is said that there are thirty churches; there are those that mention the five and the last three churches are confirmed, namely the Church of GPPS *Jalan Arjuno*, the Church of GKI *Jalan Diponegoro* and the Catholic Church of the *Santa Maria Tak Bercela Ngagel*. 14 people died and 42 were injured. Among them there are also students and children. That was sadistic and very barbaric.

Surabaya, which so far has never been close to bombing, has in fact been affected. The explosion took place at three points which were almost simultaneously. The Indonesian National Police said this was done by a family of Syrian volunteer alumni, they were Dita Oepiarto-Puji Kuswati and their four children Yusuf Fadhil, Firman Halim, Fadila Sari and Famela Rtizqita. They were family members of the Ansharut Daulah (JAD) -Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) group. With their respective duties they act as brides or field executors.

Pictures of Surabaya among other cities in Indonesia



Surabaya City

Two years earlier (2016), Christians were also the target of a bomb blast. At that time the victims were *Intan Olivia Marbun* (2.5 years) and her Sunday school friends, who were playing in the courtyard of the Sengkotek Ecumenical Church, Samarinda. Suddenly, a Molotov cocktail was thrown and exploded right in the crowd of children. The most severe victim was *Intan* where 78% of her body was affected by burns. The next day, the toddler died. Other bomb victims, like Alvaro Ora Kristan Sinaga (4), Trinita Hudahaya (3) and Anita Kristakel (2), are still being treated. That melancholy event occurred on November 13, 2016.

Marbun's family, lost his lovely child due to recurrence of terrorists Juanda (35) a former prisoner in a bomb explosion in Serpong, Banten (2011) and has been involved in a book bomb network.

On the other hand, in 2015 there were 16 Indonesians reported missing. They would, as claimed, join ISIS (*Islamic State of Iraq and Syria*) in Turkey. What amazed citizen was that they were still teenagers and toddlers and still have family relations. The identities of those who were incorporated and already in Turkey at the time were 1). Ririn Andrian Sawir (38), 2). Qorin Mun Adyatul Haq (10), 3). Nayla Syahida Achsanul Huda (4), 4). Jauzah Firdauzi Nuzula (6), 5). Ikrimah Waliyurrohman Ahsanul (8), 6). Alya Nur Islami (13), 7). Agha Rustam Rohmatullah (17) and 8). Abdurahman Umarov Huda (1). Based on police records, Ririn is the wife of Achsanul Huda, an alleged terrorist from East Java who was reported to have died in Syria in early 2015, while Qorin and other remaining names are the children of Achsanul with Ririn, (Amalia, FN, 2016).

In Indonesian context, when Islam is portrayed with various acts of violence, it will likely that foreigner are afraid to visit Indonesia. The stigma of Islamophobic emerged, which in the end actually harmed the image of Indonesia in international forums. Even for Indonesian citizens, if the fearful and worrying situation is not immediately solved by the government, of course the stigma of Islamophobic is also not easily erased.

Such fear attracts a number of researchers to elaborate this phenomenon. The same anxiety also struck Christians in Poland against the Muslim community there. Although there are only 25-30 thousand people, because of minimal interaction between them, it is quite easy to appear such fearful feelings of Muslims there (Alfin, Zuhri, Rosyidi and Stelmachowska, 2018). Referring to the results of research conducted by one of the Research Centers at the University of Warsaw it turns out there are 80 percent of Polish who do not know Islam, and 73 percent have a negative thought of Islam. The same thing is also found in the research of Islamophobic that was conducted in France. It was done especially in immigrant Muslim women who experienced the most difficult position because of the insistent discrimination. Discrimination is narrowed to the part of job search, given that work factors are an important support in the welfare of an individual's life (Ismoyo, 2016; Sayid, 2018). Likewise, de-radicalization is also important for Christians to be done through multicultural education (Jannet, 2015). Departing from such phenomena and facts, the problem statement in this research is how the generation of non-Muslim millennial interpreting the stigma of Islamophobic towards Indonesia as the largest Muslim country in the world and whether de-radicalization efforts can be the solution to this problem?

2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH FOCUS

2.1 Islamophobic

It must be acknowledged that the term 'Islamophobic' has itself led to some confusion. On the one hand, the term 'phobia' suggests a mental illness or a fear, rather than effectively picking out discriminatory attitudes and behaviours (Elahi & Khan, 2017). Islamophobic is the shorthand way of referring to dread or hatred of Islam—and, therefore, to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims”, wrote the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia in the Runnymede report a decade ago. Widely accepted as the definition of Islamophobic, and given the report's impact, it might come as some surprise that only five years ago, the term and concept of Islamophobic had little discursive relevance or value beyond the UK. Today, the situation is completely changed (Lean, 2012).

The term Islamophobic has a fairly recent origin. Emerging as a neologism in the 1970s it only became popular for European anti-racist activists in the 1980s and 1990s. September 11, 2001 was certainly a watershed moment for its use both in Europe and the United States. The term came out of a growing need to address the place of Muslim migrants in Northern countries, and the supposed divide between the Western and Islamic worlds. (Rana, 2007; Bari, 2012).

Islamophobic was first published in 1997 in the report "Islamophobic: A Challenge for Us All" by Runnymede. Then "Islamophobic: A Challenge for Us All" by Runnymede Trust. Since then, and especially in 2001, the term Islamophobic has often been used by the media, citizens and NGOs, especially in the United Kingdom, France and the United States (Runnymede, 1997;). Although it is relatively common, there is little agreement on the exact meaning of the term Islamophobic. Some writers use the term Islamophobic without explicitly determining its meaning. Whereas other authors use unclear, narrow or non-specific characterizations (Bleich, 2012; Richardson, 2012).

According to Sayyid, S. (2018). Islamophobic is a form of racism. Racism is not just the belief that humans are divided into 'races', nor is it just the ideology that holds one race is superior, and the rest are inferior, rather it is a type of governmentality. Racism as governmentality means that what is decisive is how populations are ordered, disciplined and regulated. The practice of governmentality is entirely permeated by the cultural. The history of racism is replete with examples which demonstrate again and again how what was somatic, phenotypical (or if you prefer biological) is over determined by the cultural. A discourse theoretical approach could not conclude anything different: all social relations are discursive. What distinguishes Islamophobic from other forms of racism would appear to be the way in which the central antagonism is directed at manifestations of Muslim identity. These manifestations may vary depending on the local and regional context. They may include a range of actions (including violence against property and persons, verbal abuse micro-aggressions, demonization both common and expert) that seek to deny Muslim agency.

Based on the various terminologies above, essentially, Islamophobic emphasizes certain circumstances where there is fear of Islam. It is because Islam is not interpreted as a teaching that brings peace but is more characterized by acts of violence.

2.2 De-radicalization

De-radicalization is the process of abandoning an extremist worldview and concluding that it is not acceptable to use violence to effect social change. Or de-radicalization is a process in which people reject the ideology they once embraced. This is one step further than disengagement, which is characterized by a change in behavior (stop using violence and leaving the radical group) without giving up one's radical beliefs. Often, de-radicalization (i.e., rejecting the ideology) occurs when people's commitment to the group decreases. (Bertjan, Fathali, Arie, Arjan, Liesbeth and Feddes. 2016).

Meanwhile, according to Ashour (2009) de-radicalization consist three types: (1) Comprehensive de-radicalization refers to "a successful de-radicalization process on the three levels (ideological, behavioral and organizational)"; (2) Substantive de-radicalization represents "a successful process of de-radicalization on both the ideological and behavioral levels, but not on the organizational level (usually a failure on that level is followed by splits, factionalization and internal organizational conflict, and/ or the marginalization of the de-radicalized leadership)" and (3) Pragmatic de-radicalization includes "a successful behavioral and organizational de-radicalization process, but without an ideological de-legitimization of violence." (Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, and Boucek, 2010; Ashour, 2009).

The radical movement thrives in Indonesia with the ideology of *Pancasila* (Five Basic of Indonesian Principals). The Indonesian National Police has been categorized at least three major radical groups namely; 1). *Jamaah Islamiah*, with their target is western civilization, 2). *Tauhid Wal Jihad*, with their target are all people outside of their teachings, 3). *NII* (Indonesian Islamic State), only a small group of NII committed violence. And no less than 15 of the 21 groups supporting ISIS organizations. (Kusumadewi, 2016; Wahid Foundation, 2016; Gunawan and Barito, 2018).

In terms of the number of members it is certain that they are far behind that of moderate Islamic organizations such as *NU* and *Muhammadiyah*. But in terms of action that is nuanced intolerance, they cannot be compared. Indonesia with its diversity in term of many religion, is not suitable for the establishment of anti-tolerance hard-line organizations. Diversity as a side of the wealth of this country cannot be attributed simply because it opens up space to respect organizations that are openly hostile to division.

In the broader interest, serious de-radicalization efforts and strategies are needed to create public spaces that are friendly to diversity. Because de-radicalization in general is intended to restore the love of the motherland or a sense of nationalism lost from those sympathizers or members of these hard-line organizations. According to Golose (2009) de-radicalization is all efforts to neutralize radical notions through interdisciplinary approaches, such as law, psychology, religion and socio-culture for those who are influenced by radicals and/or pro-violence . Whereas in the context of terrorism, according to Amirsyah (2012), which arises due to radical religious understanding, de-radicalization is interpreted as a process to straighten religious understanding that is narrow, fundamental, to be moderate, broad and comprehensive (Kumar, 2010; Cesari, 2011)

Even though narratively, the two concepts of de-radicalization are not difficult to understand, but at the level of implementation it is not easy. Shifting the understanding of people who are already indoctrinated with the wrong teachings will definitely require such extra time and patience. Especially since in the beginning they felt as an exclusive group with an understanding that their own beliefs are the most right and others are wrong. In addition to the need for strong commitment and seriousness from the state, the community also needs to help so as not to isolate them.

The real example which shows uneasiness to change the mindset of radical understanding was experienced directly by Noor Huda Ismail. He is an alumnus of *Ponpes* (School of Quran Study) of Ngruki, Yogyakarta. He also failed to make a chocolate business with Afghan alumni (2005), he also failed to start a rental business because his business capital was taken away. In addition, he failed to make a T-Shirt business with Moro alumni, most recently he was failed when pioneering the fishery business with Abu Tolud , because Abu Tolud re-entered as a member of a terrorist organization.

Observing the testimony of failure in order to change the mindset of the alumni who went astray, it seems that other formulations that are more relevant need to be formulated. There are 3 *Hs* that need attention. The first *H* is Heart, it is by instilling trust, second *H* is Hand, it is by providing useful skills and third *H* is Head, it is by opening the horizons of thinking of each ex-terrorist (BNPT, 2019). If that is not enough, the process of de-radicalization must also consider two *H* which should not occur when the process of de-radicalization takes place. The fourth *H*, namely Hurt, it is expected not to cause deeper wounds, and the fifth *H* is Humiliate that is not to insult or embarrass.

It can be imagined if a family that has been trapped in a radical movement, recovering the radical feeling certainly needs a long time. The alert is indeed very necessary, so that the last two *H* will not spared, and open up new wounds that are increasingly incurable (Revell, 2012; Shaik, 2011; Priyowidodo, 2010).

2.3 Multicultural Education

Pluralistic education or multicultural education is defined as a perspective that recognizes (a) the political, social, and economic realities that individuals experience in culturally diverse and complex human encounters; and (b) the importance of culture, race, sexuality and gender, ethnicity, religion, socioeconomic status, and exceptionalities in the educational process (NCATE,1986, in Hernandez, 1989: 4 in Suparno, 2017). A terminology that expressly illustrates that there should not be any discrimination, in case of ethnic, religious, as well as social status.

Multicultural education for any family can be an alternative solution to various forms of crimes against humanity which are motivated by differences in group, race, ethnicity, religion and culture. Multicultural education for children in the family is expected to be able to contribute in creating such good the character of the nation. This multicultural education can be as early as possible to form, familiarize, and instill the behavior of mutual respect, value, tolerant of all forms of differences in the environment (Amalia, 2016).

According to Grant and Sleeter (1989: 143-144 in Suparno, 2017), multicultural education has two main problems: (1) give the same opportunity for education to all students and (2)

pluralistic education. First, each student has to get the same opportunity to success in their education without discrimination. To help them success in their study, the weak and disabled students should be helped more according to their culture and situation. By considering the pluralistic situation, each student can be developed optimally.

The family does not only plays an important role in children's education, but it also functions to direct party on how the children's future will be shaped. They do not only learn about aspects of cognition, affection, connection and psychomotor, but how to build relationships and social interactions in a multicultural society.

Educational knowledge of this kind should be transmitted so that early values are embedded with respect to other parties that are not the same as other people. At least some of the indicators of multicultural education achievements can be realized. For example, it can be like learning to live in diversity, building mutual trust, maintaining mutual understanding, upholding mutual respect, being open in thinking, appreciating and interdependent, conflict resolution and reconciliation (Tilaar, 2004).

There is no shortcut to pick the formation of personality characteristics with the above uniqueness. There is such need to struggle and efforts seriously for all parties. That is why multicultural education, if implemented optimally through families or integrated as a whole in the curriculum, it can be an alternative solution for early-age de-radicalization. However, on condition that there is a synergy between the roles of the community and the government will it be successful. Do not just one of the parties to practice distortions that make the expected results even scattered.

3. Methodology

This research is empirical by using a constructive / interpretive paradigm. Phenomenography is a research approach designed to answer certain questions about thinking and learning. It originally was developed by a research group in the Department of Education, University of Gothenburg, Sweden. The word "phenomenography" was coined in 1979 and appeared in print for the first time two years later (Marton, 1981; Priyowidodo, 2013). Phenomenography is more interested in the content of thinking than is traditional psychology. Psychologists are interested in studying how people perceive and conceptualize the world. However, their focus is usually on the act of perception or conceptualization itself, and their aim is to characterize the process of perception and thought in general terms. Phenomenographers do not make statements about the world as such, but about people's conceptions of the world. According to Merton (1986) phenomenography consist three things: First, though we focus on people's under- standings of phenomena, there has been a continuing interest in the general aspects of learning. A second line of research sprang from the content-oriented nature of our study of learning. The third line of research centers around the "pure" phenomenographic interest in describing how people conceive of various aspects of their reality.

The sample used in a phenomenographic study is purposive (i.e. a non-random sample in which respondents are specifically sought out). The preferred method of data collection is via semi-structured interviews with questions that encourage the interviewee to focus on and describe their experience of the given phenomenon. Questions used are "as open-ended as possible in order to let the subject chose the dimensions of the question they want to answer.

The dimensions they choose are an important source of data because they reveal an aspect of the individual's relevance structure" (Marton, 1986, p. 42 in Boon, Johnston and Webber. 2006). The individual questions focus on and illuminate the central experience while attempting to frame the variation within the experience. During the interview, every effort must be taken to ensure that the interviewer does not let his or her own experiences and conceptions of the phenomenon influence or direct the interview. Despite the obvious difficulty in setting aside their view of the world, the interviewer must "bracket" his or her own understanding of the phenomenon in order to successfully record that of the interviewee (Ashworth and Lucas, 2000, in Boon, Johnston and Webber. 2006).

The interviews are transcribed flash disk and the transcripts are then pooled, as the focus of research is the variety of conceptions gathered from all interviewees, rather than the conception or conceptions expressed by any individual. During the interviews, every variation in conception expressed by interviewees is taken as valid and recorded. The researchers then seek to identify which conceptions are held to be in "focal awareness"; that is, which conceptions are emphasized, made pre-eminent, or otherwise focused upon by the interviewees during the interview. The identified variations of conceptions of the studied phenomenon are then categorized and described, producing a "logically structured complex of the different ways of experiencing the object...what has been called the outcome space of the object" (Marton, 1994, p. 92). The phenomenographic "outcome space" is synonymous with the phenomenon and includes articulation of the ways in which these experiences are internally related: it expresses "the different aspects together constituting that which is experienced ...not a subjective shadow of the real object, but a part of the whole which is subjective and objective at the same time" (Marton, 2000, p. 105 in Boon, Johnston and Webber. 2006).


The research subjects chosen were the millennial group (20-21 years) and non-Muslim religions consisting of 21 individuals (16 women and 5 men). The analysis in this study uses thematic analysis according to the phenomenographic study analysis stage using NVIVO software as a qualitative analysis tool.

4. Result

Islamophobic is conceptualized by each informant as an individual or group attitude that fears of Muslims who do not reflect the mission of Islamic teaching as a religion which holds "*rahmatan lil alamin*" slogan (peacemaker for all people). The conception of all informants explained that the phenomenon of Islamophobic was caused by two main things. They are internal and external causes. Internal includes excessive fanaticism, hatred, bad prejudice, like to disbelieve people who are not religious to the low knowledge possessed. The external is associated with news of violence which is always displayed by ISIS fighters.

However, Islamophobic, which is often dramatized with various acts of violence such as bomb terror, attacking a police post, church bombing and even a series of other acts of persecution, should not be allowed to continue. There must be an effort to stop it. This is called the de-radicalization movement. The aim is to return those who belong to radical line groups to moderate Islam peacemakers. That is why it needs a relevant approach, changing the way of looking, monitoring and evaluating.


Furthermore, de-radicalization movement is how to improve the function of the family so as to instill multicultural values early on. If their religious views are wrong, then the community should warn that destructive actions can be prevented. The role of family, education and right religious doctrine is very important. Through the visualization of the image below, it is very clear that each element has its own role.



4.1 Conception to understand the Causes of Islamophobic

This fact makes it clear that the fear of Islam is triggered by two main factors. First, is an internal factor. It has something to do with the wrong perceptions arising from some Muslims who damage the good image of Islam. Because of the wrong perspective, they then take actions that are contrary to Islamic teachings. They terrorized by bombing, provocation, hate speech, narrow fanaticism practices because of their low religious knowledge. Second is an external factor. It includes cultural differences, discriminatory practices, the presence of negative influences and exposure to ISIS news.

Moreover, the issue can be seen through the visualization of the image below:



The informant's conception of the cause of Islamophobic depends greatly on the experience of their interactions with Muslim. The less they interact, the greater the possibility of prejudice. As it is shown in the following interview citation:

Interview 1 :

Q: What is Islamphobic?

A: a bad prejudice (bad stereotypes that lead to prejudice) of people of different religions in seeing Muslims,

C: What is considered bad is not the religion but the elements of fanaticism and radicalism that spread heresy, practice it, and spread it, and have a great impact which is detrimental to many people.

Interview 2 :

Q: What do you think Islamphobic is?

A: In my opinion Islamophobic is a negative attitude caused by some people related to hatred or dislike of Islamic religion or culture

C: This constitutes discriminatory behavior towards Muslims, separating them from the economic and social life of the nation. This attitude can lead to conflict and riots between Islam and other religions.

The informant's point of view clearly illustrates that the conception of Islamophobic must be understood as inseparable from the causes. When someone has a narrow knowledge or is often exposed to the news of ISIS (*the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria*) which is very provocative and anti-humanitarian, it is firmly embedded in our minds that Islam either as a State entity or as an individual is very alarming.

4.2 Conception to understand De-radicalization


In common not all Islamic organizations are radical and anarchist in the implementation of their activities. *NU* and *Muhammdiyah* are large Islamic organizations that are very moderate and defenders The Nation. Peter G. Riddel (Ummah, 2012), divided four forces namely; modernist, traditionalist, neomodernist and Islamist in Islamic movement. In general, Riddel agrees to the definition of each category by ignoring one category from Woodward, namely indigenized Islam. For Riddel, each category has its own characteristics in responding to various crucial issues in the first years after the first election, the collapse of the New Order, namely 1999. These issues included returning to the Jakarta Charter, the Maluku crisis, opening Israeli trade relations, the federal state of Indonesia, where minorities within the Indonesian state system, women presidents, and political parties only opened their faucets after the collapse of the New Order.

The grouping done by Riddel above when viewed from the interpretation side can be narrowed down to just two groupings, namely liberal moderate and radical or fundamental. Liberal and moderate Islam is an open interpretation of the teachings of Islam, even though it is not exactly the same, while radical or fundamentalist Islam has a closed interpretation. Some Islamic groups such as the Liberal Islamic Network (JIL), NU's Institute for Human Resource Research and Development (LAKPESDAM), Muhammadiyah's Young Intellectual Network (JIMM), are some Islamic groups that can be categorized into open-flow Islamic groups. In addition to liberal Islam, hard-line Islam or radical Islam enjoys much political change in Indonesia. This radical Islam has developed into one of the new Islamic movement groups that have important significance in Indonesia. These radical Islamic groups emerged. Some are international Islamic movements such as the *Salafi* and *Hizb ut-Tahrir* movements. Others 118 are national-scale movements such as the FPI or Islamic Defenders Front, *Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia*, *Laskar Mujahidin*, and Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood or *Ikhwanul Muslimin*. In addition, local radical Islamic movements have emerged such as the Surakarta Islamic Youth Front (FPIS) in Surakarta and the *Tariqah Jihad* Front (FTJ) in Kebumen (Ummah, 2012).

However the problem is why this radical Islamic mass organization is so progressive?. It is because the actions are often demonstrative and very familiar with violence. Even though it is

unlikely to be hated, the mass media also contributed to the existence of these mass organizations in a free in charge alias free coverage through its coverage. Sweeping acts of prostitution localization, denial of Christian church or religious attributes before Christmas, triggered to be reported and could become viral in social media. Regardless of whether readers agree or not, the message that is spread becomes an advantage for raising such organization.

Another implication, if this radical behavior continues to be neutralized, Islamphobic will automatically harden and spread. One effort that must be done is the de-radicalization movement. The informants said that there were successful programs but some were not. They can be seen through the visualization of the image below:



As far as the state can do, so that the radical movements or fundamentalism cut in their existence is elaborating the factors. According to Tibi (2000) there are two contexts that must be understood, namely cultural modernity and world order. According to Bakry (2004) there are five factors namely, socio-political factors, religious emotional factors, cultural factors, ideological factors, and government policy factors. It is the inability of government in Islamic countries to act in improving the situation over the growing frustration and anger of some Muslims due to the ideological, military and economic domination of large countries. (Priowidodo, 2017).

Empirically, the conception of informants related to de-radicalization can be seen in the following interview citation:

Interview 1 :

Q: What do you think of the current de-radicalization efforts?

A: The government is good enough in eradicating radical Islamic groups in Indonesia so as to allay people's anxiety. In addition, they have done good interaction on social media between non-Muslim Muslims, mutual support and justification of a good Islamic outlook.

C: Positive community groups and the participation of young people play a large role in neutralizing the situation. Indonesian people nowadays tend to try to boost tolerance and tighten the kinship, seeing the condition of the country which is often attacked by SARA (ethnicity, religion, race, and inter-group relations) issues.

Interview 2 :

Q: What do you think of the de-radicalization?

A: In my opinion as long as terrorism and radicalism in Indonesia are still exist, this de-radicalization effort cannot be said to have been successful as a whole. Perhaps there are indeed many cases that show that the government can change the mindset of the perpetrators of terrorism into the correct path and become normal in general. But there are still many people who still have deviant thoughts in Indonesia.

C: Government efforts in de-radicalization in Indonesia are explained by the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNTP), in which this de-radicalization is done in two ways. They are soft approach and hard approach. These two things are expected to minimize or prevent the existence of terrorism in Indonesia. This soft approach is an approach that is closer to the perpetrators of terrorism and the people involved through the provision of material and so on. The way is done more smoothly. Meanwhile, the hard approach is more directed at ways that already involve legal agencies.

Inventory of de-radicalization efforts to curb the spread of Islamophobic can be increased. But, at least the identification can be captured clearly by the state to correct what is the source of lameness and injustice that occurs in society.

It also does not make sense, if the country has made optimal efforts, but these steps are ignored and not appreciated. If that's the case, it seems that the de-radicalization with the soft approach needs to be increased to a hard approach or the country has to do a lot of repressive action.

It is also worth observing in terms of this de-radicalization effort, the state must not separate present reality. Stronger and seamless interconnections resulting from the careful development of Information Technology must be considered. Isn't it true what was alleged by Coleman and McCahill (2010, Winarni, 2014). They said that the radical Muslim movement claimed that more than half of the Saudi youth were recruited through the internet. It has the same case in Indonesia. It turns out that many young people are interested in joining ISIS also through video uploaded on YouTube.


It is therefore, there is no other choice; the resistance strategy must also use the same or more sophisticated instruments. Without superior IT capabilities, the country will be overstated by various attacks by mass organizations which are now increasingly skilled in conducting cyber attacks. What is meant by cultural modernity by Tibi should not be narrowly understood as

conventional culture clash but also involves the dynamics of cellular culture or internet culture

4.3 Conception for Understanding Multicultural Education

Worry or fear feeling of Islam, among others, was also contributed to by the lack of success in multicultural education experienced by informants. The informant still sees his/her own best group. Interaction with other groups or Muslim communities is still lacking. There arises suspicion and even greater fear of Islam. Multicultural education is the best way to build trust in a pluralistic society. Indeed, multicultural education should be taught within the family to open opportunities for social interaction without suspicion. Religion, do not continue to endorse its members with an exclusive understanding but more on things that are inclusive.

The maps of the multicultural conception can be seen through the visualization of the image below:



The conception of multicultural education to prevent the spread of Islamophobic is a phenomenon of lack of interaction with Muslims. As stated by informant X below:

Interview 1 :

Q: What do you think about Multicultural Education?

A: In my opinion it is effective enough to make one's mind and perspective to be more open. By knowing various religions, one will know to tolerate and respect others. Concretely, for those who are non-Muslims can be further clarified by the teachings of Islam that is actually

good and peaceful. Their negative perspective is quite straightened out with trusted knowledge, such as schools and universities.

C: -In my opinion it can also prevent the growing fear of Islam because of the need for an early understanding of themselves and also their own people "

Interview 2:

Q: What do you think about multi-part education?

A: In my opinion, it depends on the thoughts of the people in the educational institution. Because based on the experience that I listened to my friends too, sometimes there are still people in these educational institutions who are racist traits towards non-Muslims. It also happens from educational institutions that accept Muslim.

C. As long as they accept differences and have a very high attitude of tolerance. The communication process of multicultural education can be fairly effective. Because, sometimes it is even from the teaching staff of the educational institution itself that sometimes builds the impression of Islamophobic to students. In which they should the provide thoughts that are neutral towards a religion, but there are only teachers who have very subjective thoughts about a religion.

Indonesia is home to many religions like Islam, Christianity, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. Islam is the majority religion (82%). That is why in order for Islamophobic not to continue to develop; every family regardless of religion must be managed in the spirit of mutual respect. The family is a subsystem of a larger social system. If the family experiences ideological disorientation, the situation that occurs in the country will surely experience the same thing. Why? It is because the state is a reflection of the sum of each family. The family is the smallest unit in a large set that requires order for a system to work well.

China for example, adopts one child and one ideology. What can be seen? The country with a population of more than 1.3 billion is able to control up to 0.43% (2016) its population growth a year. Indonesia, with a population of 263 million was only able to suppress the rate of change at 1.17% (2016) even in 1990 it was almost 2%. It can be imagined if Indonesia is not careful in population policies, not only is the population growth rate accelerating but poor families are also increasing.

What is the impact of increasing poor families? It directly or indirectly implies that these families were infiltrated by ideologies that offered a shortcut. They do not have enough knowledge to filter or even analyze whether the ideology is constructive or even destructive. This condition is very worrying.

Not surprisingly, those trapped by radical movements or terrorism are those who have an economically poor background and narrow knowledge. Even according to Afif M. (Jannet, 2015) there are at least five causes of the emergence of radicalism in the religious field, including: (1) erroneous or narrow understanding of the teachings of the religion they hold; (2) social injustice; (3) poverty; (4) political revenge by making religious teachings a motivation to justify their actions, and (5) social inequality or jealousy over the success of

others. Or according to Azra's term, there are three key words for radicalism, namely violence, sacredness and truth claims. Violence is part of social action, sacredness is a belief to maintain the truth and purity of religious teachings, and the claim of truth is the recognition that his beliefs are the most right teachings while other beliefs are wrong. (Azra, in Naim, 2014).

Undoubtedly, for those who have entered the terrorism network or radical movement, the internalization of the three values is very easy if they are through an institution that is very close to them, namely the family. The family can be informally used as a medium for radical groups to increase members, because this method is considered effective and safe. Purwanto (2015) an intelligence observer explained that the process of recruiting new members was carried out in private. It may in case of friendship, kinship, brotherhood and companionship.

In line with this opinion, the next step according to Tambunan (2013, in Priyowidodo, 2017) is to develop the organization. There are four tools used to see the success of recruiting members of the organization namely 1) motivating and guiding ideology, 2) leadership 3) continuity of recruitment and 4) publicity.

In the context of motivating and guiding ideology, the family is the right forum. Radical doctrines or teachings will easily be socialized from parents to children with relatively no constraints. Why? It is because children will definitely take parents as the 'role model'. When children witness what their parents do, they will act or behave in accordance with existing practical examples.

Not surprisingly, in the subsequent development of the organization, strong and solid leadership is very much considered by making the smallest cells in order to facilitate the continuity of recruiting members. The reason is one, so that their clandestine movements cannot be easily detected by the authorities. The way is to target families who understand religion and with economic capability. This method is considered not too provocative and provokes publicity. Only when everything is ready will this movement bang on the public with the pounding of an action that spreads fear. For example it may like in case of suicide bombings, bombing strategic facilities to plan to detonate the State Palace.

It seems right, the noble meaning of the expression that the family is the pillar of the state. If many residents of the family are in shambles and do not have a strong commitment to the state ideology, slowly but surely the country will collapse. Fighting militancy should be oriented towards realizing national goals which are the shared aspirations of the nation's children. Not precisely, pestering with a radical ideology that weakens the unity and integrity of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia. Especially at the end it actually spread Islamophobic throughout the world. Indonesia advertises everything in the international media and is still seen as a country with full of risks when visited by foreign tourists. Islamophobic is a bad image that is actually counter-productive which can reduce competitiveness and prevents foreign investment from entering Indonesia.

5. Conclusion

Islamophobic is a conception of thinking related to the tendency to behave which places that Islam is frightening. This fact was triggered by various acts of violence carried out by a group

of radical Muslims with acts of terror, bombings and actions against humanity. Islam as "*rahmatan lil alamin*" is actually kept away as a positive image of Islam.

The conception of de-radicalization is understood as a positive effort made by the Indonesian government with the soft approach and hard approach method. So far the results have been effective, although not yet at maximum. Because there are former members of hard-line Islamic groups after undergoing the process of de-radicalization back to their groups.

The third conception is multicultural education, which is understood as a way to prevent exclusive thinking that only feels that the group itself is correct. Meetings with other cultures, religions or ethnicities are believed to be a means of preventing radical Islamic extremist actions.

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