

Political - Religious

Violence

In Indonesia

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Preface

The objective of this research is to figure out the social construction, the historical and the structural context, and the mass mobilization regarding the destruction of churches in Situbondo.

The method employed is the social construction in which the researcher gathers information in the field through observation and in-depth interview, in addition to careful reading of the cultural texts. The information obtained from the informants, or *the first order understanding*, is comprehended through the theoretical framework of Berger and Derrida in order to reach new meaning called *the second order understanding*.

The historical context showed that Situbondo Community were adhering strictly to their religion and tended to be nativistic, notably they were unwilling to receive the outside influences contrary to their heroic cultures forged by their history which were characterized by the inter and the intra-religion conflicts, as well as the political engineering.

The structural context of Situbondo was highly susceptible to incidence of the religious-political violence. In the framework of Gurr's thought, Situbondo community underwent decremental deprivation in line with land, aspirational problems, and many other problems that the sugar cane farmers faced with, as well as progressive deprivation in political homogenization and religious hegemonization. These conditions were very vulnerable to any conflict when militarism entered into the community life.

In respect with the mass mobilization, it appeared that each mass group was derived from the same culture or subculture. A leader of the mass group was the one who was recognized by and well known, members of his subculture.

The social construction on reasons that underlined the action of violence could be explained from Berger perspective. However, Derrida perspective was used to discern a multiplicity of social construction. The social construction of the religious-political violence showed that the action in the destruction of

churches was an attempt to channel their dissatisfied emotions against the ruling elites' attitude and decision. This reflected the construction of thought as Berger's, suggesting that some violence happened due to the presence of threat from *the other* against *the self*. The social construction of the actors explained that the action in churches destruction must be done since their religion justified it in attempt to preserve their religious identities. This also described the construction of thought as Derrida's, maintaining the idea that the violence action was derived from *the self* toward *the other*, while other social construction lay between the construction of thought that belongs to Berger and Derrida.

Surabaya, May 17, 2021

Prof. Dr. Thomas Santoso, M.Si.

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1.

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background

In the New Order regime, there was a myth on the existence of religious harmony in Indonesia. The myth is often exposed through cliches, by government officials, that the religious harmony in Indonesia which is based on the Pancasila and 1945 Constitution is the best one and often serves as an example or a model by other countries (Taher, 1997). Suddenly, in an instant, the myth on the existence of religious harmony in Indonesia, which had enchanted the world society for decades, has faded with the occurrence of destruction of 24 churches in Situbondo, October 10, 1996. The events which were so shocking had unmasked the secret which was mythologized during that time, about inter-religious harmony which had always been covered up in the Indonesian public eyes.

Since the proclamation of the Republic of Indonesia on August 17, 1945 until December 31, 2000, there were at least 786 churches which were destroyed, burned, closed and resolved (ICCF, 2001: 1). From year to year, the frequency of destruction had increased, so the average interval of church destruction was getting shorter. During period of 1940s, there was no church destruction. In the 1950s, on average, one church was destroyed every ten years, then every five months in the 1960s, every two months in the 1970s, every month in the 1980s, every week in the 1990s, even every three days in 2000.

Since 1996, the events of church destruction in Indonesia were sufficiently and completely documented, for example, time and place of events, chronology of events, and data of victims were recorded, and most of them were well documented through photos and videos. The data of church destruction in 1945-1995 for some 241 churches was not complete because only provinces were known without mentioning municipalities/regencies, time of occurrence was recorded within a period of ten years,

church's names were not recorded so that the denomination was not clear. During the period of 1996 to the end of 2000, 545 churches were destroyed, burned, closed and resolved, which were recorded well (Tahalele & Santoso, 1997; see also ICCF, 2001).

The 545 churches (100%) can be sorted over the years and scenes under church denominations as well as physical and symbolic violence forms. In 1996, 71 (13.03%) churches were destroyed, burned and resolved which were recorded, then there were 92 churches (16.88%) recorded in 1997, there were 134 churches (24.59%) recorded in 1998, there were 123 churches (22.57%) recorded in 1999 and there were 125 churches (22.94%) recorded in 2000.

Based on the scenes, church destruction occurred in various parts of Indonesia covering 84 regencies/municipalities. Of the 545 churches, the destruction occurred more frequently in Java (283 churches/51.93%) than outside Java (262 churches/48.07%). The church destruction more frequently occurred

in coastal towns (354 churches/64.95%) compared to inland towns (191 churches/35.05%).

Church denominations are distinguished into Protestant, Pentecost and Catholic. Those belonging to Pentecost in this study are the churches which are the members of the Indonesian Pentecostal Council (DPI) or call themselves Pentecost, for example, Surabaya Centre Pentecostal Church (GPPS), although becoming a member of the Communion of Churches in Indonesia (PGI), but still call itself Pentecost, is included in Pentecostal denomination. The 545 churches are comprised of Protestant (285 churches/52.29%), Pentecost (194 churches/35.6%) and Catholic (66 churches/12.11%).

If Java and outside Java are distinguished, then the composition of destruction in Java is Protestant (114 churches/20.92%), Pentecost (141 churches/25.87%) and Catholic (28 churches/5.14%). Meanwhile outside Java, Protestant (171 churches/31.38%), Pentecost

(53 churches/9.72%) and Catholic (38 churches/6.97%).

Based on the types of violence committed, of the 545 churches, 508 churches (93.21%) experienced physical violence and 37 churches (6.79%) experienced symbolic violence. Symbolic violence occurred more frequently in Java (27 churches/4.95%) than outside Java (10 churches/1.83%). Physical violence was usually followed by semiotic violence in the form of writings on church's walls which smack harassment against Christian religion. This must be answered empirically as the increase of 1000 Christians in Muslim-majority areas would generate a Christian growth rate higher than the increase of 1000 Muslims in such areas. This empirical fact is also applicable for the growth rate of Muslims in Christian-majority areas.

From the statistical data, regencies/municipalities which became the scenes of church destruction, it can be seen that the church destruction occurred in regencies/municipalities with the percentage

of Islamic religious adherents as majority, while the growth rate of Christians exceeded the growth rate of Muslims in such areas. For example, in Surabaya, the percentage of Muslims: Catholics: Protestants was 83.88 : 5.52 : 6.84. The growth rate of Muslims: Catholics: Protestants was 2.15 : 6.74 : 2.56. Surabaya population growth rate was 2.18. The contrary fact occurred in the mosque destruction which occurred in regencies with the percentage of religious adherents of Christian as majority, while the growth rate of Muslims exceeded the growth rate of Christians in such areas. For example, in Kupang, the percentage of Muslims: Catholics: Protestants was 6.72 : 11.47: 80.79. The growth rate of Muslims: Catholics: Protestants was 9.18 : 6.53 : -0.89. Kupang population growth rate was 0.58. This must be answered empirically as the increase of 1000 Christians in Muslim-majority areas would generate a Christian growth rate higher than the increase of 1000 Muslims in such areas. This empirical fact is also applicable for the growth rate of Muslims in Christian-majority areas.

The religious heterogeneity index greatly affected whether the violence lasted for a long time or not. The greater the religious heterogeneity index, the longer the violence lasted. For example, the violence in Central Maluku with religious heterogeneity index of 0.5215 lasted longer than the violence in Situbondo with religious heterogeneity index of 0.0332.

Based on the description at the beginning, it can be presumably concluded that the church destruction occurred more frequently in Java Island than outside Java, occurred more frequently in coastal areas than inland areas. The church destruction was also experienced by all denominations (Protestant, Pentecostal and Catholic) in various forms of violence (physical or symbolic).

This study purposively set the case of the destruction of churches in Situbondo dated October 10, 1996 as a telescope of political-religious violence in Indonesia. This is because Situbondo has some uniqueness, i.e. it is a coastal town in the Java Island which most

experienced the destruction of churches; having strong Madurese and Islamic cultures; it was the first case of church destruction on a large scale in which as many as 24 churches were destroyed/burned from various denominations (Protestant, Pentecost and Catholic); and there were five fatalities in the riot which lasted one day, there was also physical, symbolic and semiotic violence.

There were at least three things responded by people related to the violence in Situbondo, namely the perpetrators of violence, the context behind the violence as well as social institutions and cultural institutions involved in the mobilization of masses.

In the study of social sciences, the Situbondo case is actually the intersection between violence and religion in the midst of political repression called political-religious violence. The study of political-religious violence is relatively new because all this time it is still difficult to find violence literature concerned with the political-religious linkages. Studies of violence are usually linked

with only political dimensions or there are also some who relate violence with religion only.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

Based on the ideas described at the beginning, through a socio-historical approach, this study tries to find answers to the following issues:

1. How do the perpetrators of political-religious violence in the Situbondo case construct the reasons underlying their actions to commit the destruction of churches? Do the reasons underlying their actions to commit the destruction of churches come from the opposing party (the other) against themselves, as stated by Berger? Or do the reasons underlying their actions to commit the destruction of churches come from themselves who attacked the opposing party (the other), as stated by Derrida?
2. What factors become the context of social construction of the political-religious violence perpetrators? Has religion

experienced auto-immunization, as stated by Derrida, as an attempt to show the identity and self-determination? Does rapid mobilization of Islam occur simultaneously with the entry of aggressive Christian; Islam (feels) marginalized by Christian; or Islamic mobility which is high and quick, so requiring accommodation, whereas the existing position is already occupied by other party? Do other factors such as issues of land, economy, construction of oil refineries, etc. which are not completely solved also constitute the context of social construction of the political-religion violence perpetrators?

3. Through what social institutions and cultural institutions is mass mobilization driven in the political-religious violence? Is the mass mobilization possibly performed by outsiders? Or is mobilization carried out by insiders who are known by the masses? Do the masses need cultural identities to start moving? Or do the masses first move rollicking and then search for cultural identities?

1.3. Objectives of the Study

This study aims to acquire knowledge and understanding which are more systematic and accountable regarding the construction of underlying reasons, the context behind violence, as well as the mobilization of masses in matters of political-religious violence. Thus, it is expected that the understanding of the political-religious violence which occurred in Indonesia can be telescoped from the case of church destruction in Situbondo, and conversely by understanding the Situbondo case deeply, the political-religious violence occurring in various areas in Indonesia can also be understood.

2.

BASIC THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Violence

Power and violence are two different concepts, but cannot be separated. The most striking difference is that power is always dependent on the number of supports, while violence can occur without these supports, as violence is based on implementation. An extreme form of power is all against one, while an extreme form of violence is one against all. Violence is often regarded as a prerequisite for the power because violence is often used to keep the power from the opposition of individuals (Arendt, in Steger & Lind, 1999: 3-7).

Hannah Arendt stated that violence is an instrument which always requires guidance and justification through the objectives pursued. Power does not require justification because the required one is legitimacy.

Power develops when people are united and act collectively, but it obtains legitimacy from the initial grouping and not on subsequent actions. Legitimacy bases itself on a review of the past, while justification is related to the objectives which certainly exist in the future. Violence can be justified, but it will never gain legitimacy (Steger & Lind, 1999: 7-11).

Power and violence are different phenomena, but usually occur together. Violence does not depend on the number of supports or opinions, but on implementation. The implementation of violence increases and doubles the power. Replacing power by violence may produce a victory, but the price of it is extremely high because the price is not only paid by the losing party, but also by the victor. Powerlessness frequently produces violence because of the loss of power becomes a temptation to change power by violence. Violence appears when power is threatened.

Therefore, Ted Robert Gurr defined political violence as all collective attacks within a political community against political

regime, its political actors, including political groups which compete, as well as officials or their policies. This concept describes a set of events, use or threat of use of violence collectively ... The concept includes revolution, ... guerilla war, coup d'etat, rebellion and riot (Gurr 1970: 3-4). Gurr's opinion on political violence is relatively narrow because seeing the legal side of the ruler, and more reliant on actor's actions or group of actors who are considered rebelling against the ruler. Whereas in social science studies, violence must be seen as a whole, in its illegal or legal manifestation.

Meanwhile, Johann Galtung defined violence in a broader sense. According to Galtung, violence occurs when people are affected in such a way, so that their actual physical and mental realization is under their potential realization (Windhu, 1992: 64). Violence here is defined as a difference between potential and actual ones. On the one hand, humans has potential which still exists "inside", and on the other hand, potential demands to be actualized, that is, by realizing and developing itself and its world

with the values it holds. Definition of "actus" here may include activities which are not visible (such as thinking, reflecting, as well as other psychological or mental activities) and actions, activities which are visible/can be observed. This is the thing which presumably becomes the starting point in understanding violence as the cause of the difference between actual and potential ones. The essential supposition is what could or might be actualized, must be realized (Windhu, 1992: 66). However, not all potentials develop into actus.

Galtung also differentiated personal, structural and cultural violence. The nature of personal violence is dynamic, easily observed, showing great fluctuations which can lead to changes. Meanwhile, structural violence is static in nature, showing a certain stability and invisibles (Windhu, 1992: 73). Cultural violence is related to cultural aspects which can be used to justify personal violence or structural violence as described earlier. The cultural aspects which are used to justify violence are religion, ideology, language and art.

2.2. Religion and Violence

Apologetically, it is too simple to claim that religious teachings basically do not have violence element, and only humans who divert from the real meaning. In fact, the roots of violence can be found directly in religion, and therefore religion can easily be used as a vehicle for violent tendencies (Houtart, 1997: 1). The facts show that history of human life, as stated in the narrative of Scriptures, is a history of violence. In morality, religion, indeed, does not teach or commit violence. However, religion especially prophetic religion, will commit acts of violence when their identity is threatened. The believers of this religion feel that the violent acts they commit are justified by their "God".

The problem is getting more complex with their new understanding which states that religion plays a role in other parts of the world as the ideology of society, especially in religious nationalist movements, where religion and political ideologies are combined. When these cases are revealed, religion becomes innocent, with the record of

not leading to violence. However, in reality, by the combination of the order of political, social and ideological life, religion is fused with expressions of violence as the embodiment of social aspirations, self-esteem and movements for political changes (Juergensmeyer, 2000: 9).

If religions have legitimized certain violent acts, they are also trying to limit the frequency and space of such actions. This confusing attitude reflects the use of violence as a means to defend themselves and comply with religious norms on one side, but also know the potential of destructive nature which cannot be controlled against the other party. In most of the religions, a person encounters profound suppression between the use and sublimation of violence and a courage to be a "holy martyr" who sacrifices his/her life for the lives of others (Appleby, 1999: 11).

To blow up violence, religious identity must destroy individual identity on a large number of people, revive the feelings of love associated with the initial identification with the members of a group owned by a person,

and hatred against other groups whose members are homogenized and their dignities are abused. For the occurrence of violence, threats to religious identity must fight against certain barriers, where potential judgmental actions become actions of anger which are fully activated, which are clearly seen through and between the members of a religious group. Triggered by rumors, ignited by religious demagogues, the desire to judge gives a signal for group identity extermination and must be confronted by the strong inauguration. Religious involvement compared to other social identities will not die out slowly, but on the contrary, increase violent conflicts. Religion brings conflict between groups of greater emotional intensity and coercion motivation which is deeper than language, area or ridicule against other ethnic identities (Kakar, 1996: 192).

In the meantime, the author defines religion as a belief system emerging and manifested in the life of people through interactions of worship (ritual system), and responsive to the situations faced by its

adherents (community system). In such definition, religion should not lead to violence because it is revealed precisely as a guide to live in peace and mutual respect. However, in fact, religion can lead to violence when it intersects with other factors, for example, group/national interests or political repression. Religion can be misused and misdirected both from external and internal sides. From the external side, prophetic religions, such as Islam and Christian, tend to commit violence immediately after their identities are threatened. From the internal side, prophetic religions tend to commit violence because they believe their actions are based on the will of God. Operationally, political-religious violence is associated with the ritual system and community system as stated by Durkheim, O'Dea and Wach, or magic as stated by Weber. Therefore, the understanding of religion or how religion is interpreted is one of the reasons underlying political-religious violence.

2.3. State and Violence

If a state is regarded as reactionary force aimed at restoring the traditional order, or progressive movement for people's interests confronting empire, dynasty, and privilege, then there is no force capable of preventing the state from using violence or engaging in acts of violence (Steger & Lind, 1999: xxi). All types or categories of state definitely have a tendency to legitimize the use of violence against other parties who are perceived as those who threaten the existence of the state.

State and political system which is adopted constitute aspects which are closely linked to its activities and position in the use of violence. State-centered view that a state is the actor who also plays in the arena, including determining the political system which is adopted and attempts to monopolize and legitimize the use of physical force (Held, 1990: 111). Thus, the power, which can be considered as the capability to use power effectively, and the political system, which can be considered as a means to implement the power, is the main basis of the

state's existence. Thus, the power, monopolistic claims against physical force, and the political system are very fundamental to the existence of the state.

Therefore, the author argues that a state is the only institution which legally monopolizes the use of coercive force through the state apparatus, such as military, police and judiciary. Violence is legitimized by the state to maintain its power. Violence will appear where power is in danger, which means that although violence can destroy power, violence is not able to create power. In the beginning, the violence is directly committed by the state. However, with the outbreak of human rights issues, then the state is not enough to use its coercion apparatus, but must also involve the society. The seeds of violence have spread over in society through criminal organizing, not criminal organization. The state has mobilized people to commit violence. In this case, the criminalization of politics has shifted to the politicization of crime.

2.4. Social Construction on Political-Religion Violence

According to Berger and Luckmann, human is the creator of objective social reality through the process of externalization, just as the objective reality influences back human through the process of internalization. Dialectics between the self and socio-cultural world takes place in a process with three simultaneous moments, namely externalization, objectivation and internalization (Berger & Luckmann, 1990: xx). A thorough understanding of these three moments thoroughly will obtain an adequate view of society empirically. Externalization is a continuous outpouring of human selfhood into the world, both in physical and mental activities. Objectivation is the bearing of such activity products (both physical and mental), a reality facing with their original producers, in the form of a facticity which is external to, and other than, the producers themselves. Internalization is the reabsorbing of this reality by humans, and transforming it once again from the structures of objective world into the structures of subjective consciousness.

Through externalization, then society is a product of human. Through objectivation, then the society becomes a *sui generis*, unique reality. Through internalization, then human is a product of society (Berger, 1991: 4-5).

The problem of violence occurring in single and regular structures can be explained by Berger's social construction. However, for the violence which involves or occurs in complex and irregular structures needs Derrida's deconstruction. Derrida's deconstruction gives space of more adequate explanation regarding the problem of diverse and unique violence, compared to monistic explanation.

In connection with the violence, Derrida stated there has been an assumption that the violence is committed by the other against the self. In fact, the violence is often started from the self. The self begins to distinguish itself with the other. Then, the self creates a boundary between itself and the other. Eventually, within the self and the other are constructed as if they have partition which

can only be breached by violent acts (De Vries & Weber, 1997: 1-12).

In the study of social construction, it is understood that there is correlation between violence, religion, state and capital. Religion, in the sense of ritual and community systems, can lead to violence when intersecting with other factors, such as a state. In this case, the state is believed to be the only institution which monopolizes violence; it does directly through the state apparatus, or indirectly through society. Meanwhile, the social construction on political-religious violence is formed when humans recognize the emergence of the dominance of majority religion (religious hegemony) occurring concurrently with the political dominance of ruling party (political homogenization). In such situations, capital is a conditional prerequisite, which allows interest groups to be mobilized to carry out political-religious violence.

3.

METHOD

To achieve the objectives as formulated in the beginning, the study method used was a qualitative study method. Qualitative method is used here because this method focuses on the analysis of understanding and meaning. Through this method, the social reality intended to be revealed or studied was subjective reality in the form of understanding. Qualitative study method also sought to examine the essence, give meaning to the political-religious violence in Situbondo.

3.1. Data Collection

Data were collected by going directly to the scenes especially to collect information relating to the political-religious violence in Indonesia, and more detail data were collected specifically for Situbondo Regency. Actually, most of the data had been

collected since 1996, through the SCCF-ICCF, a forum which was formed with specific tasks, among others, documenting the data of the destruction of churches.

In 2000-2001 researchers determined Situbondo as a telescope of political-religious violence and collected the data with the following steps:

a. Mapping of the Political-Religious Violence in Indonesia

At this stage, the researcher disaggregated the data of church destruction which occurred in Indonesia, since August 17, 1945 up to 2000, according to municipalities/regencies, church denominations, Java or outside Java, coastal areas or inland areas, type of violence committed, etc. Map of political-religious violence, in the form of destruction of churches or destruction of mosques on an annual basis or on a cumulative basis, made

with a computer program of Photoshop.

Furthermore, the statistical data was collected from 84 municipalities/regencies which became the scenes of the political-religious violence. Of various calculation simulations, finally it was apparent that the political-religious violence was associated with the growth rate of religious communities and religious heterogeneity index. The growth rate of religious communities was calculated from the following formula:

$$LPUB = \frac{(\%) UBTA_k - (\%) UBTA_w}{N}$$

LPUB =Growth Rate of Religious Communities
 UBTA_k =End-Year Religious Communities
 UBTA_w =Early Year Religious Communities
 N =Number of years observed

Meanwhile, the religious heterogeneity index was calculated from the following formula:

$$IHA = 1 - \frac{\sum X_n^2}{(\sum X_n)^2}$$

IHA = Religious Heterogeneity Index

X_n = Adherents of each religion

To understand the reality of political-religious violence in Indonesia aforementioned, it requires explanations through careful reading on the history of the entry of religions in Indonesia. It is also required to explore a variety of news from various newspapers, magazines, books, and research reports relating to such events.

b. Mapping of the Political-Religious Violence in Situbondo

At this stage, the data of Situbondo was collected in Numbers, years 1980-1996 from the Central Agency on Statistics. The data was processed and analyzed per subdistrict in order to obtain a clearer illustration of the geographical conditions, local governments, population composition, education, livelihood, religious composition, and political constellation for each subdistrict. The religious composition was further processed so as to find the growth rate of religious communities and religious heterogeneity index per subdistrict. Similarly, the data of the results of general elections was further processed and analyzed in order to obtain an overview of the power of political parties per subdistrict. The data obtained at this stage was very useful for the researcher to be used as a foothold at the time of collecting qualitative data.

c. Review of Cultural Texts

At this stage, a careful and in-depth reading of cultural texts in the form of historical books, documents, mass media news, religious broadcasting, research results, etc. was conducted in order to obtain an illustration that political-religious violence had been evidently recorded in the history of Situbondo society life. The cultural texts were also useful to produce a new meaning about the relationship between the social construction concerning the reasons underlying the acts of church destruction and the social context of political-religious violence perpetrators.

d. Participant Observation

Most of the activities were carried out to collect the data required to obtain an overview of the local situations or social settings which became the context for political-religious violence. The social settings

were obtained through participant observation, i.e. viewing and listening the story of social life in the study areas from the version or vision of local residents.

e. In-depth Interviews

Information about the social construction of political-religious violence (study focus) was obtained through in-depth interviews. The in-depth interviews were conducted with key informants and informants who were selected on the basis of their reliability in describing and explaining about the experience of their lives or the lives of others. These informants were selected not on the basis of the principle of representativeness and adequacy in connection with the population, but rather on the basis of the quality of these informants' reliability as a truly informative source.

Informants were chosen purposively, through theoretical

sampling via snowballing, extreme, deviant methods, etc. (Patton, 1990), by the researcher, by considering their quality as a truly informative source of information. Several key figures interviewed here were KH. Fawaid As'ad, H. Fathorrasyid, Mr. Muniggi, Mr. Saleh, Kiai Zaini, Lora Kholil, Family of the Late Achmad Sidiq, Mr. Andre, Rm. Benny, Pdt. Samuel Lie, etc. Some of the difficulties encountered were that there were some informants who no longer lived in Situbondo with a variety of reasons, so the researcher interviewed the informants outside Situbondo. For example, Saleh was interviewed in the Correctional Institution in Yogyakarta, Rm. Benny was interviewed in the Diocese of Malang, H. Fathorrasyid was interviewed in the Office of the Regional House of Representatives of East Java in Surabaya, and so on. To build rapport, the researcher lived and mingled in the informants'

environments although only within a limited period of time.

In-depth interviews were carried out gradually. Firstly, the researcher interviewed leaders or figures of Christian, Catholic and Chinese who were the victims of Sepuluh-Sepuluh Incident. Secondly, the researcher interviewed the leaders of related government agencies, namely the District Court, Police, District Military Command, Local Governments, Hospitals, Department of Religious Affairs, Correctional Institution, Subdistricts, etc. which were in Situbondo. Thirdly, the researcher interviewed several Muslim leaders from NU, Ansor, LPS-NU Pagar Nusa, Muhammadiyah, Islamic Boarding Schools, MUI, ICMI, etc. Fourthly, the researcher interviewed the trigger of Sepuluh-Sepuluh Incident, i.e. Mr. Saleh and Kiai Zaini as well as some of his students. Fifthly, the researcher interviewed the actors and or the field coordinator in the Sepuluh-Sepuluh

Incident to know the social construction becoming the reasons for political-religious violence. Some of the actors were interviewed in South Malang and Surabaya. Finally, the researcher also interviewed some of those who were considered to have first hand information about Sepuluh-Sepuluh Incident, for example, researchers from the Joint Fact Finding Team of East Java Ansor, DIAN-Interfidei Jogjakarta, Gadjah Mada University of Yogyakarta, Airlangga University of Surabaya, etc.

Depth interviews were conducted by using interview guideline (not a questionnaire), and in this case, the questions have been developed in the field. Thus, it can be said that the researchers were an "instrument" of study. Subjectivity of the researchers themselves was controlled by means of organizing discussions in a peer group or comparing it with the results of other similar studies. Discussions were often

conducted through face to face meetings with social scientists and researchers in Surabaya and Yogyakarta. Also via e-mail with scientists and researchers in some countries.

3.2. Data Processing and Analysis

Dilthey, as stated also by the phenomenological thinker, said that historical events can be understood in three processes, namely: (1) understanding the viewpoint or idea of original actors; (2) understanding the meaning or significance of their activities on things which are directly related to historical events; and (3) assessing the events based on the ideas prevailing at the time the historians are alive. (1) and (2) processes are first order understanding and (3) process is a second order understanding.

The method used by phenomenology to obtain first order understanding is requesting the researchers of this group to ask the party being researched to obtain the correct explanation. For example, if the party being

researched said that it was involved in the destruction of churches, then the information is not enough for the researchers. The researchers should ask back: "how was it involved in the destruction of churches?" Some similar questions can be asked in order to obtain information about the perpetrator's involvement in the destruction of churches (throwing stones, burning equipments or buildings, etc.), what drove the perpetrator to perform such actions (spontaneous, ordered, etc.). Information such as this is called externalization according to the understanding of Berger.

On the other hand, the researchers have not quite understood the issues which are based on the information from informants. The researchers are obliged to perform reconstruction so that one information can be described in relation to other information. In this case, the researchers provide an explanation or understanding which will generate a new meaning. This new meaning is what is called second order understanding in the phenomenological

method, or objectivation according to the understanding of Berger.

4.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1. Social Construction

For Madurese people, this proverb 'bappa-babu, guru, rato' applies. Madurese first must honor their father (bappa) - mother (babu), Kiai, Lora, Religion Teacher (guru), then government (rato).

The perpetrators of the political-religious violence in the Sepuluh-Sepuluh Incident had diverse social constructions associated with the underlying reasons for their actions to the destruction of churches. There were perpetrators who acted spontaneously and without prior planning in doing their actions. As Madurese, their thoughts were upset and emotions were heightened spontaneously when they heard of anyone who dared to offend Kiai. For Madurese, this proverb 'bappa-babu, guru, rato' applies. Madurese first must honor their father (bappa) - mother

(babu), Kiai, Lora, Religion Teacher (guru), then government (rato). Their anger at Saleh (Islam) was switched to the church, when they were provoked that Saleh's punishment was relatively light because the judge was Christian, and Saleh was rumored to have changed his religion to Christian and was hidden in the church. They just believed such issues because they once heard that in the event of July 27, 1996, Budiman Sudjatmiko, a Leader/Figure of Partai Rakyat Demokratik, was also hidden by Christian, i.e. Romo Sandiawan.

The perpetrators whose destructive actions were an attempt to deliver their emotions of dissatisfaction against the attitude or decision of the authorities. Thus far, there was a gap between the Ulama and Umara in Situbondo. Umara was judged to be unhelpful for Ulama, such as through the prohibition of data collection of NU members, prohibition of collecting donations for the construction of mosques in the highways, up to the efforts to hinder the provision of electoral participants card to the students of Islamic Boarding Schools whose Ulemas were accused by Umara to have

been affiliated with the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan. On the contrary, Umara always behaved well towards Christians and the Chinese people. The permits of establishing churches could be obtained through collusion with Umara. This fact made the Muslims, especially the perpetrators of political-religious violence, to have been disturbed by the presence of Pentecost whose worship activities were judged noisy and aggressive in their daily lives. They were also ignited by the presence of Protestants who dominated economic life, as well as the presence of Catholics who dominated political life in Indonesia. In the thinking construction of political-religious violence perpetrators, it was revealed that at that time the government was Golongan Karya's government, which was a political party emerging suddenly which prohibited when there was one other political party.

The perpetrators believing that the actions of church destruction were worth to do because justified by religion in order to maintain group identities. Situbondo society known to be very religious and was dubbed as a Santri City felt threatened by the rapid growth of churches.

According to Islam, there had been too many churches in Situbondo, and for establishing a church must refer to the Joint Decree of the Minister of Home Affairs and Minister of Religious Affairs No. 1 Year 1969. On the other hand, Christians believed that there were many denominations and each preferred to have its own place of worship, and church activities were also so diverse so that requiring adequate facilities. In respect of the Joint Decree No. 1 Year 1969, there were several churches in Situbondo which had been established before such Joint Decree was made and there were some even established before the period of independence. Permit to establish churches was considered strange by Christians as there were many mosques established without permission.

For Muslims, the establishment of magnificent churches in Situbondo was considered to intentionally harass Muslims whose lives had been quiet. On the contrary, according to Christians, the presence of some churches which looked majestic was still within reasonable limits. Basically, construction of churches was financed independently by

congregation. Magnificent churches were not for showing off, but driven by the intention to give the best things to God.

In connection with the matter of permissions for the construction of churches, there were different views, namely: for Muslims, when there were few people who did not agree with the construction of churches, then the churches may not be built; but according to Christians in the state which was based on Pancasila, there should no be any party that claimed an area as an exclusive area for its religious group only and group activities of other religions were strictly prohibited. If anyone did not agree to the efforts of the establishment of churches, then it was the duty of every citizen to give the understanding that religious activities must be protected.

Among Muslims, there was an emerging issue of Christianization in various forms, such as: ways missionaries preached, foreign assistance funds for the propagation of religion, "purchase of faith" through donations of food and or scholarships, materials of textbooks for elementary/junior high students. Christianization

issue was often preached by certain religious figures. In this case, Christians were like on the horns of a dilemma: providing assistance was (regarded) accused of Christianization, not providing assistance was accused of not caring or not having a social sensitivity. On the other hand, there was also an emerging issue of Islamization among Christians through the easiness/facilities of government such as the assistance of Islamic Religious Teachers, Da'i delivery at the expense of the state, ICMI activities which expanded into various forms of life, as well as efforts to establish an Islamic state in various ways.

Some perpetrators of political-religious violence understood that their religion justified the destruction of churches. According to them, in the Quran, there was a command to Prophet Muhammad to destroy the dhinar mosque. If the dhinar mosque itself was commanded to be destroyed, let alone places of worship of other religions which were certainly worse than dhinar mosque. However, most Muslims understood it not such way because it was expressed in the Quran that even in a war situation, it is not justified to damage places of worship of other

religions. Moreover, the Situbondo cases occurred in a state of peace, and not in war situation.

It is undeniable that one of the main causes of the outbreak of the Sepuluh-Sepuluh Incident was feeling challenged of Islamic groups by the aggressiveness of Christian groups in spreading the influences of their religion because the Islamic groups that had a sense of pride in the identity of a Santri City felt that the attitude of Christian groups threatened their existence. Moreover, the Islamic groups were also obsessed by a distinctive motto to which they professed, which was generally held firmly by the Madurese people: "*tembang poteh mata, anggo'an poteh tolang*", meaning it would be better to die than to be ashamed. Being conditioned by the culture of being proud of their own identity and indoctrinated by the motto of life, better to die than live in disgrace, then presumably it is understandable that the presence of Christian groups who established churches along the main streets of Situbondo was not only regarded as a challenge to Muslims in Situbondo which already owned the identity of a Santri City, but also considered to have

embarrassed them. If the churches were built in places which were somewhat a little bit inside, which were not seen too conspicuous by everyone who passed through the Surabaya-Banyuwangi, then restlessness of Situbondo society might not be so severe. Because, anyway, the identity of a Santri City which was obtained by Situbondo town gave its own image which became the pride of the local communities. Thus, any attempt of a party to affect or contaminate such image would cause opposition from the communities.

There were perpetrators of political-religious violence who just went along with it. They felt that so far there was no problem with Christians or Chinese, but the mass movement had undermined the values they believed in. They were drifted and floated off into the mass movement which came in waves, which inadvertently strengthened each other and increases the emotionality and irrationality of others.

Perpetrators who argued that their actions were supported by a force, in which they themselves did not know who the person

was, who provided various facilities of violence acts through a careful planning (planned action). Most perpetrators claimed that the political-religious violence occurring was the results of the disputes of center political elites which were framed by religions, or the results of a conspiracy between political elites at the central level for striking down to each other. Not only the victims, the perpetrators of violence also felt victimized by the disputes of political "giants". It is interesting to study how the perpetrators of the political-religious violence, the victims and the masterminds who were alleged to be attackers, trying to provide an explanation putting themselves in the category of victims of objective religious-political power which was broader. And how nice when using these frameworks of thinking so as not be blamed by others.

4.2. Social Context

4.2.1. Historical Context

Political-religious violence actually did not happen suddenly. It also happened in the Sepuluh-Sepuluh Incident. From the history

search, it seems that the Sepuluh-Sepuluh Incident was closely related to the religious-political problems which had occurred in the past, albeit in a somewhat different form. History shows that Situbondo society was communities which were very fanatical about their religion, and also had a tendency of nativist, which was reluctant to accept outside influences which were not in accordance with their cultures, which were formed by their historical background which was fully characterized by inter-religious contradictions as well as political engineering/manipulation. Political-religious violence seems to be so historical and entrenched in the life of Situbondo society. No exaggeration if it is stated that the history of Situbondo is a chronic political-religious violence history.

4.2.2. Structural Context

Governance in the area of Situbondo experienced leadership dualism. Formally, the governance coordination was governed by the Local Government (Umara). However,

informally, Kiais noticeably had more roles than Umara. The decisions made by Umara were not necessarily adhered by its citizens or if being adhered by the citizens because there were certain pressures from the Umara. Conversely, what was said by Kiais always became a role model by local people in attitudes and actions. Dualism of leadership was becoming more conspicuous when the Local Government had difficulties in implementing a decision so that the Central Government was forced to make a direct intervention to Kiai. As a result, in the political field, there had been a change of patronage in which some Kiais as a political broker changed their supports from PPP to Golkar. The government also "created fake kiais" who obtained funds from Golkar. As a result, on the one hand there was decline in Kiai's charisma, and on the other hand, the authority of the Local Government was fading.

Almost all inhabitants of Situbondo are settlers from other areas. The earliest settlers are people from Makassar (Makasarese), most settlers are from Sumenep who occupy

the White Sand area to the east, and Bangkalan/Sampang who occupy the White Sand area to the west. Besides, there are also immigrants from Arab, Chinese, etc. Javanese people belong to minority population in Situbondo. The relationship between Madurese and Makasarese, Javanese and Arabic is good enough due to their equality in religions. Meanwhile, the relationship between the Madurese and the Chinese only is limited to the economic field.

Parents in Situbondo tended to entrust the education of their children to the Kiai in Islamic Boarding Schools than to teachers in formal schools. The reasons: the Madurese was very obedient to Kiai, the view of Ahlussunah Wal Jama'ah taught belief in the concept of blessing and intercession which were solely owned by Kiai as heirs of the Prophet, and the view of Ahlussunnah Wal Jama'ah which was imparted to students was only found in the Islamic boarding schools. However, currently there have been drastic changes, when salaf boarding schools which previously implemented a typical Islamic boarding school system, which differentiated

clearly between aspects of intellectual development and aspects of personality development have been replaced by school system in the form of madrasah.

The facts show that there was a tradition inherited from generation to generation in Islamic boarding schools since the time of the Kingdom of Demak, namely the tendency to arm themselves and train themselves in armed groups. The tradition was even stronger when there was a phenomenon of succession, in which the parties who lost always stepped down from power political affairs to build an Islamic boarding school. The tradition of succession actors who lost to establish an Islamic boarding school, in turn would put the position of the Islamic boarding school not just as an educational institution (an sich), but more similar to the form of kingdom on a small scale. It means that, in the Islamic boarding schools, the students were not just taught the sciences of religion and morality, but also soldiering science which included martial arts, science of wisdom (supernatural power) and practicing hizb-hizb making students becoming resistant and

having other suprahuman powers. This is the fact becoming militarism seeds in Islamic boarding schools.

Most of the local people in Situbondo made their living in the agricultural sector, namely farmers, farm workers, animal husbandry, and fishermen. Inhabitants who made their living as traders are quite a lot because Situbondo was a coastal town and was also the main line of the road between Surabaya-Banyuwangi (Bali). Madurese people generally made their living in the agricultural sector. Javanese people mostly became government employees and occupied important positions in government. Meanwhile, the Chinese people mostly made their living in the trading sector. In terms of ethnicity and livelihood, Situbondo population had no cross-cutting affiliation so that its social cohesion was less strong. Trivial issues would bring a great impact on ethnic clash.

Meanwhile, the Situbondo economy underwent a drastic change when infrastructures and facilities of land

transportation developed rapidly and natural factors (sedimentation), which became the cause of the decline of the port Panarukan. City Center had changed over from Panarukan to Situbondo. In addition, many government decisions concerned with land issues such as in Banongan, in Blangguan and in Tanjung Pecinan were judged to be impartial for public and or were not solved completely. Consequently, there was a public opposition against the government over the years. The public opposition in the form of violence reached its peak just shortly before or concurrently with the Sepuluh-Sepuluh Incident. The public opposition could usually be mitigated after the government asked for Kiai's help.

At the same time, there was also a rejection of sugarcane farmers in various villages in Situbondo against government program which obliged to plant Intensification Citizenry Sugarcane (TRI). The reason was because every year sugarcane farmers always experienced losses and felt cheated by Sugar Factories. They assumed

that the Regional Government was just the representative of Sugar Factories.

Islamic religion which developed in Situbondo was Traditional Islam, Nahdlatul Ulama, which adhered the teachings of one of the four Sunni Madhhabs and tended to perform the practices of the syncretic worship. NU in Situbondo had several factions. This was reflected by the pros and cons regarding the candidacy of Gus Dur as a candidate for the Chairman of the Central Board of Nahdlatul Ulama in a Congress in Cipasung, 1994. As a “blue-blooded” person, grandson of the founder of NU, Gus Dur deserved to be honored by NU followers in Situbondo. However, to become a Chairman of the Central Board of Nahdlatul Ulama, some of NU followers in Situbondo believed that it was better to be handed over to other because Gus Dur was too smart and his people got difficulty understanding the ideas and thoughts of Gus Dur.

Some religious issues arising in Situbondo approaching the Sepuluh-Sepuluh Incident were the encroachment of mosque land by

administrative village employees, the entry of Darul Arqam – which was forbidden by the Government of Malaysia – in Situbondo, as well as mutually discrediting utterances and actions between those who changed their religions. On the other hand, the mobility of Muslims which were quite high and fast could not fully be accommodated and this occurred concurrently with the entry of aggressive Christian.

With the number of Muslims in majority and obedient to Kiais, then it was very reasonable if Situbondo Regency was politically dominated by the Islam-labeled party. Elections in 1977 and 1982 were won by PPP. The Victory of PPP was originated in three aspects. Firstly, Situbondo society generally considered that PPP was an Islamic party which represented the aspirations of Muslims. Secondly, the public assumption that Golkar was a party for government employees and armed forces as well as retirees and did not represent Muslims. Thirdly, the qibla of Kiais to PPP had led their people in droves to follow their role model figures.

Various ways which were made by the Golkar such as working visits and provision of various forms of assistance by the Minister of Development Cabinet (Golkar) to community, provision of scholarships by Golkar government to students in Islamic boarding schools, inviting supportive actresses of Golkar to entertain the public, up to sneaky and dastardly attempts to hinder the process of voter registration which was expected not to vote the Golkar, as well as the practices of manipulation of the vote counting, eventually led to the victory of PPP which was successfully defeated by the Golkar. For 1987 and 1992, Golkar became the winner of Elections in Situbondo. In connection with the Sepuluh-Sepuluh Incident, it turned out that the political-religious violence occurred in Subdistricts in which the votes acquired by Golkar in the election of 1992 were smaller than the PPP, and or the votes acquired by Golkar in such Subdistricts was lower than the votes of Golkar in Situbondo Regency level.

Militarism had been deeply rooted in the life of Situbondo society. In the subdistrict of

Asembagus, there were a Military Combat Training Centre which was the largest in Java and Marine Combat Training Centre which was the largest in Indonesia. In 1992, for example, a joint combat exercise II of Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia was held. A few days after combat exercise, there was a boy who died while playing pretended war at such location. LPS NU Pagar Nusa was also known by Situbondo citizens as martial arts warriors who often eradicated gambling, prostitution and gangs of young people through violent ways. Violence in the form of massacre of witches by local people also often happened in Situbondo in the 1990s.

The phenomenon of militarism in the NU environment – in its history – could not be separated from the growth and development of the organization consisting of the Salaf Muslims (orthodox), which was commonly called as traditional Muslims. Kiais never undertook mass mobilization. Mobilization was undertaken directionally via the trained organizations. That is why, until the elderly Kiais who had military backgrounds were living, political-religious violence was carried out

directionally and systematically and involved only members who had been trained militarily. However, the successors of Kiais did not inherit the vision, mission, and commitments of military and nationality as their predecessors. The successors had less ability to recruit and mobilize through neat and professional organizations. In the decade of the 1990s, NU masses were completely disorganized and easily provoked for particular interests.

Militarism as a concept to commit acts of violence in efforts to destroy the opposing party which was considered as an enemy, had been pervaded in the life of Situbondo society. Not only soldiers who committed violence, but also students, local people and even children committed violence in different forms.

4.3. Sepuluh-Sepuluh Incident

Strong hints about the occurrence of political-religious violence in the Sepuluh-Sepuluh Incident were places of worship, in this case churches as a religious symbol,

which were used as the targets of mass rage and occurred several months before political event, the General Election in 1997. The destruction of 24 churches in six subdistricts in the Regency of Situbondo was obvious to be committed systematically. The targets were certain churches in the Situbondo Regency. The proof was the mass who damaged the Situbondo District Court Office did not move southward. For information, 15 Km south of the Situbondo District Court, there were some large churches, which were located in the Prajekan Subdistrict, Bondowoso Regency. The road leading to the Prajekan Subdistrict was relatively wide and smooth, and the distance was also not too far from the Situbondo District Court. However, the masses moved 70 Km eastward and 38 Km westward to find the target of churches which were still in the area of Situbondo Regency. The masses also had prepared the equipments to damage, plastic bags containing gasoline/kerosene, paint, etc. The masses were transported in vehicles which had been previously prepared by unknown persons.

Some of them were proven to give some money to the masses.

The Sepuluh-Sepuluh Incident itself was actually triggered by a family dispute between Saleh and KH. Achmad Zaini. The reality of such family's dispute had changed when KH. Achmad Zaini constructed that Saleh seemed to have committed defamation or humiliation against Islam. For Situbondo people which are known religious, the construction of religious defamation was judged far more to the fore than the reality of the dispute itself.

There were some peculiarities which occurred in the Sepuluh-Sepuluh Incident, including: many parties claimed that Kiai Khos in Situbondo suggested that the case of Saleh not be brought to the court, whereas in some cases of previous religious harassment, such as the case of Mar in Panarukan, Kiai Khos always claimed that the concerned person was brought to the court; security forces were not ready to anticipate and or overcome the riot, it seemed that the security forces allowed the violence to occur; military

reinforcements from other cities were considered to be very late coming to Situbondo; the parties provoking the masses were not local people because they did not use Madurese language of Situbondo dialect; and the local people, who were involved in the riot, just moved after they were commanded by other parties whose faces were not clear because being smeared with black charcoal and allegedly came from outside Situbondo.

Political-religious violence in the Sepuluh-Sepuluh Incident occurred in six subdistricts, namely Situbondo, Panji, Asembagus, Banyuputih, Panarukan and Besuki. Statistical data shows that the population in the six subdistricts were relatively large, the population growth was relatively high, the ratio of population per Km² was relatively dense, the levels of migration were relatively high, particularly the people who came in were greater than the people who came out. The composition of population as above was very influential on the intensity of political-religious violence.

In respect of education, the political-religious violence in Situbondo occurred in the six subdistricts whose growth rate of school students (formal) was relatively high. It can be interpreted that the education in schools had been directing man in secular life, so the understanding of religion became increasingly shallow and slumping. This understanding of religion would be easily used to trigger political-religious violence.

In terms of religion, the six subdistricts which experienced political-religious violence were the subdistricts whose majority population was Islam, while the growth rate of Christians was higher than the growth rate of Muslims. Heterogeneity index of religious communities in the six subdistricts was also relatively high.

Post Sepuluh-Sepuluh Incident, the political-religious violence still continued in the form of persecution by security forces against citizens who were “accused” as the perpetrators of violence. Through the torture, they were forced to admit that the “scenario” of the mastermind of the Sepuluh-Sepuluh

Incident was Kiai's Khos. Unless, it was also visible on the efforts of the military to pit between religions, for example, the security forces involved in the torture were perceived to use the symbol of non-Muslims, those who were arrested as if because there were non-Muslim clergy reports and so on. The torture by the security forces resulted in the death of Ahmad Sidhiq, a member of LPS NU Pagar Nusa who had always been at the forefront in the eradication of gambling, who was backed by Armed Forces officers in Situbondo. Apparently, a violence would bring forth to new violence was not just a theory because the proof was found in the Sepuluh-Sepuluh Incident.

In the political-religious violence events, there were always parties who could be called as peacemakers. The teachers' actions prohibiting their students to join the mass movement and the local people who reminded the masses not to damage or stop to damage in the Sepuluh-Sepuluh Incident could be classified as peacemakers. They were trying to fight the urge to commit violence, fight against efforts which justified

violence, and played a major role in dampening or reducing acts of violence. If there were no peacemakers, the Situbondo riot would be even worse.

4.4. Mass Mobilization

Social institutions and cultural institutions which were used to mobilize the masses were different from one group to other groups.

The mobilization of santri in the Sepuluh-Sepuluh Incident could not separated from the roles of figure of Kiais. In this case, there were Kiais, intentionally or not, having been involved to mobilize their students in the riot activities. However, there were also Kiais who acted as peacemakers. Meaning that when the Saleh case was emerging, they tried to be peacemakers, and when the riot truly happened, they were trying to prevent their students from being involved in the riot.

School students were mobilized by people who were suspected to originate from outside Situbondo because they were not known by the local people, did not use Madurese

language of Situbondo dialect, and smeared their faces with black charcoal. They provoked students through the idiom of religion and ethnicity, provided some trucks N license plates, gave commands to the students to damage churches, and some of them were proven to give money to students.

The coastal communities were mobilized by invitation, who said on behalf of NU groups, to gather in certain places with several vehicles having been prepared. The masses who had been ready with various equipments were then transported to the District Court and targeted churches. Meanwhile, the NU said that they never issued such invitation.

The local people were mobilized by several young men, some of them wore Street Children (Anjal) uniforms. The street children group was made up of former robbers, drunks, witches, agitators, etc. which were then supervised by Lora Kholil in a prayer group. Many of those returned to the right way. However, there were also some who bought and sold the name of Lora Kholil for personal

benefits. Therefore, Lora Kholil disbanded the street children on June 14, 1996.

Outsiders, especially Madurese people who were the victims of the East Timor riot and were temporarily placed in South Malang, were mobilized through the idioms of religion by a group who had helped and accommodated them. They certainly still kept a sense of revenge, so were easily provoked by others, who obviously had helped them. Moreover, for damaging churches, they provided various facilities such as vehicles, food, and money. The rioters, some of whom dressed as Ninja, carried equipments including Molotov bombs, rummaged Situbondo within four hours without obstacles.

The mobilization of the masses was carried out systematically, the evidences were there were several stages to trigger the emotions of the masses through various issues and slogans of religion for momentary political interests, up to their efforts on the provision of means of transport, equipments, funds, etc. Their thoughts which were upset and their emotions which were heightened caused the

masses to be easily directed by the field coordinators to the churches which had been determined. The masses who were involved in the riot came in waves. As the reference, the first mass wave performed throwing and destruction, was a test case as well on how much the capacity of security forces to counter them. Then, the second wave was released with the harder action (burning) to determine whether or not there were repressive actions from the security forces and fire brigades.

The Sepuluh-Sepuluh Incident is much likely to be manipulated in such a way by certain groups to get certain political image and impression, or at least to reduce the credibility of a particular party. Some indicators clearly justified the existence of disguised manipulation, among others: it was impossible for masses to perform destruction simultaneously and direct to specific targets, such as churches if no ones who organized and directed them. The preparations had been made through meetings, church location data collection, provision of vehicles, equipments, funds, etc. The field coordinators

used hit and run tactics and seemingly very understood the character of masses so as to be capable of leading the masses to keep moving and in action.

5.

CONCLUSION AND THEORETICAL REFLECTION

5.1. Conclusion

1. The perpetrators of political-religious violence in the Sepuluh-Sepuluh Incident had a multiplicity of social construction with regard to the reasons underlying their actions to commit the destruction of churches. There was a social construction which originated from the other towards the self as stated by Berger; there was also a social construction which originated from the self towards the other as stated by Derrida. Some of the perpetrators even had a social construction which was between social construction by Berger and social construction by Derrida.
2. Historical factors, inter-religious contradictions and political

engineering/manipulation which occurred in the past, and structural factors such as the dualism of leadership and education, composition of the population, economy, political homogenization, religious hegemony and militarism, became the context of social construction of the perpetrators of political-religious violence.

3. The mobilization of masses was undertaken by the leaders of each group, namely those who were known by their members and knew their members. The mobilization of funds was undertaken by the initiators of violence through temporary coalition with the leaders of groups.

5.2. Theoretical Reflection

Theoretical reflection is the answer to social matters having been described earlier. There are five things which will be presented in theoretical reflection, namely: (1) the position of political-religious violence among other various similar forms of violence; (2) the

definition of political-religious violence; (3) the context of political-religious violence; (4) the mobilization of political-religious violence; and (5) the social construction of political-religious violence.

Firstly, the concept of political-religious violence was selected and used in this study after setting aside some of the other concepts such as political violence, religious violence, political and religious violence, religious politicization violence and religious political violence. So far, there is a tendency in various textbooks on violence which were written by American and European scientists, when an incident of violence occurs in Islamic countries, it is called religious violence, while if similar violence case occurs in Western countries/Non-Muslim countries, it is called political violence. Biases could happen in the labeling of violence. However, possibly also because in Islamic countries, there is no separation between religion and politics, while in Western countries/Non-Muslim countries strictly separate religion from politics. Meanwhile, the political and religious violence contains the meaning of

separateness between politics and religion. The word “and” in English shows the relationship between two things which are distinct and separate. On the other side, the religious politicization violence shows the existence of political process which utilizes religion, meaning that religion has lower position and is governed by political interests. Meanwhile, the religious political violence is analogized with the violence which utilizes identity politics. Identity can be defined as religion, so the violence of identity politics can also mean religious political violence. Finally, the political-religious violence which was selected in this study because this concept examines the politics and religion as an integral source of violence in a balanced position. The concept of political-religious violence can be analogized with the words of religio-politics, socio-politics, socio-economics, and so on which imply that the sign (–) is used to describe the relationship of equality.

Secondly, the political-religious violence is a crisscrossed relationship between violence, religion, and politics because the three are

related to the objectives of ruling as well as the use of ritual ways to realize these desires. Thus, the political-religious violence lies at the intersection between religion and violence in the middle of political repression of a regime. Or, in other words, the political-religious violence is a state in which the heightened political homogenization occurs concurrently with disturbed religious hegemony, and is then revealed through violence.

Thirdly, as stated by M.B. Pranger (in Vries & Weber, 1997: 3), the roots of political-religious violence can often be found precisely in the discourse and in the value system which clearly demand to abolish or reduce the political-religious violence. Relying on such statement it can be proven that the explanation of the political-religious violence in the Sepuluh-Sepuluh Incident can be found in the socio-historical experience of inter-group relationships in Situbondo, which became the context of social construction for the perpetrators of political-religious violence. The establishment of magnificent churches on the main streets in Situbondo which coincided with the overthrow of PPP as an Islam-labeled

political party by Golkar had threatened the identity of the communities of a Santri City. This context becomes “dry grass” which can be burnt at any time when there is one who lit it with “fire”.

The rule is that every community can get a leniency, but there are moments where the rule should be loosened, when it should be enforced on those who have already suffered from a lot of losses. The rules found in Situbondo were a set of formal rules and practices which were obeyed by small communities, a set of informal rules and practices which were followed by large communities. Lack of legitimacy in such formal practices and rules was considered ineffective and partial, while the practices perpetuated violence.

By bringing up the issues of beliefs and sentiments of Situbondo people, political-religious elites were also involved in the process of finalizing the political-religious violence, in what was believed to be a conflict among political-religious elites to fight over an object which was no longer sacred,

but having power and money values. From this dispute of political-religious elites, the event was transformed in mind to be a defense of beliefs and sentiments of santri. Some field coordinators in the riot were the members of Islamic boarding schools who had studied the ideology of Islamic nationalism from young ages. The ideology raised the Islamic religion to be thorough beliefs and have a political meaning, which transformed the Muslims from the population of heterogeneous belief devotees with various role models of Kiai to be political institutions which were united by the shared convictions. In this case, the Islamic religion had undergone simplification, politicization, mobilization and had been made transcendent, the highest values which were above other beliefs and national laws. This was called political-religious communication processes, which became a crucial connection between religious harassment by fellow Muslims and the destruction of churches in Situbondo.

In connection with the matter in the beginning, ambivalence is the key word to

understand the context of political-religious violence. Ambivalence has occurred in the understanding of political-religious life. The understanding of religion which teaches love and peace in the political-religious life, the reality is confronting with the understanding of religion which becomes the source of political-religious violence. The behavior of political-religious elites who had double faces, namely on the one hand, they acted as peacemakers, but on the other hand, they turned to be violence makers. The ambivalence of the perpetrators of political-religious violence against internal and external values and the interrelationships led to revenges, in the realm of uncertainty between laws and violence.

However, here there were two unsolved mysteries. The first mystery was how the masses were so brave to be involved in political-religious violence in the repressive political situation at that time. The researcher had given an explanation that such actions were driven by the desire to take revenge, but this reason could not explain how such desire could be easily performed without being

punished. It also could not explain how an event of political-religious violence which caused losses of life and property could be transformed into the torture by the military against the santris who were accused of being perpetrators like a war. However, the second mystery, was about the level of cruelty which occurred. Were all churches destroyed and all Christians hated? There was no doubt in the minds of researcher that all targeted churches had been destroyed, but researcher did not know whether or not every Christian was hated. The researcher also did not believe on the reports of the author of Fact-Finding Team, which had never been published, which denied the existence of hatred against Christians, knew more about it. However, this author of the report who made decisions and revealed that the masses admittedly did improper actions and the stories about mass atrocities had been greatly exaggerated. The researcher did not believe this as the truth and vice versa.

Just as in other political-religious violence cases, we also know when there is a dispute between two political-religious groups, the

military will favor one of the groups. However, we do not know what becomes the center of the dispute and why the military sides with one group, except once again because the military is angry and wants to take revenge. But what is the reason for taking revenge?

Here, it is revealed that the military sides with certain group and they are accustomed to engage their political opponents in wrong cases. Although their claims can be right or wrong, the military is currently free to take revenge, as they commonly do if being attacked or harassed. The santris who were demonstrating in the electoral registration and undertook the eradication of gambling who were backed by the military, were then accused of being the perpetrators of the destruction of churches, arrested, harassed, beaten and jailed. This perpetuation of violence is related to the absence of military accountability to the communities they serve.

It is true that the military should maintain its status, but of course they are not allowed to escape from the violence. Violence is reduced to be administrative problems

because the military performing brutality only receive light administrative punishment in the form of transfer of duties. No changes are made in military training in order to prevent the occurrence of this kind of event in the future. Only a few who record about the lack of trust between communities and the military in general.

The military's role in this case was in the form of their ability to escape from the claims of responsibility attached to them, various supports which were given by state agencies, including senior state officials who protected them, as well as the Fact-Finding Team that eliminated their fault brought up other questions beyond the use of discourse of political-religious violence. Here, we are confronted directly with the Hobbes's argument about the relationship between society, security and state. A sovereign state should justify its existence by protecting the people from war "all against all" which occurs naturally, by assuring the security in society as a requirement for people's loyalty to the state.

The military does not act only as the agent of state to execute a court order or even does not just make mistakes through violent ways. They do what they used to do, by being involved from one local conflict one to other local conflicts. In addition, the matter is not just how to control a political-religious violence, but how to control the military. Who controls the military will control the political-religious violence.

The same thing in the case of political-religious violence perpetrators and the violence which was committed by the military is the way of accountability, regardless of such case is published or not, we are not able to reveal the core of truth. Although this study does not reveal the essence of political-religious violence, but the researcher has sufficiently understood to show that there was a hidden truth behind the incident. The hidden truth in this case involved the daily character of this incident and the nature of the close relationship between military, politicians, religionists and civilians with the militarism. Other hidden truths involved the interests of those who expressed their

sympathy for the victims of violence and condemned those who committed violence or allowed the violence to happen. Such interests were clear, although there were still many people who found it hard to accept and believe, that nothing could be done to disturb the position of those who benefited from the occurrence of such incident.

Some state officials or leaders of political parties can only say that there will be no political-religious violence when they are in power. When they say this and are serious with it, they are usually able to prevent political-religious violence or reduce its impact. They do these, firstly, by making their political supporters know that they want communal peace when they are in power. Secondly, by making all the officers of state administrators know that they will all be responsible if they allow the occurrence of political-religious violence. Thirdly, they identify the areas which are vulnerable to political-religious violence and officials who are known to be very strict and neutral and they will send the neutral officials to such areas.

Fourthly, whose interests playing through the organization of the conflict of political-religious violence related to the Sepuluh-Sepuluh Incident in Situbondo? Situbondo residents themselves claimed that the political-religious violence was the result of a conspiracy between the military, politicians, religionists and leaders in both central and local levels.

This study shows that in a certain place, with socio-historical reasons, there was a system of political-religious violence which was institutionalized. The meaning of the institutionalization of the political-religious violence system is a network of actors, groups and relationships involving people from different social categories whose impact, regardless of the purpose, is to make a city in a state which is always aware of the relationship between Islam and Christian.

The essence of this system is – borrowing a term by Paul Brass (1997) - the specialists of political-religious violence, that is, people who are always active at any time to monitor the daily life of a city where they live or where

they always visit. The specialists of political-religious violence include people from all walks of life who play a role based on their status in life.

Therefore, the specialists of political-religious violence are specialists who are capable of changing the events which occur between communities, in this case between Muslim and Christian communities, becoming an opportunity of the occurrence of riots. When it is time to trigger large-scale riots, then santris, students, people from the lower class in the suburbs and outside the city, criminals, and special forces who are trained will take the roles. In the areas which are vulnerable to political-religious violence, these groups have likely been used before and are always ready to engage in such events if they receive commands. In the most extreme cases, larger masses will go down to the streets who come from various walks of life.

In the matter of this political-religious violence, the perpetrators of political-religious violence are considered as attackers. They are highly trained in the practice of political-

religious violence, who are always ready to use violence and are regarded as heroes by their communities. Therefore, the perpetuation of political-religious violence is not natural and inevitable conflict. We can select the places where the political-religious violence happened and did not happen in the past, comparing them based on various demographic and ecological criteria, and then make a hypothesis or a set of hypotheses to estimate why the political-religious violence happened in some places, but not elsewhere. Therefore, what can be generalized into a hypothesis which can be accepted is that the political-religious violence is most likely to occur in cities with A religion in majority. while the growth rate of communities with A religion is lower than the growth rate of communities with other religion, and religious heterogeneity index in such cities is relatively high.

Fifthly, the political-religious violence which occurred in Situbondo 1996 is impossible to be described monistically. This is reflected in the diversity of thought construction of the perpetrators of political-

religious violence in the Sepuluh-Sepuluh Incident. Construction of thought in the perspective of Berger (1966) who saw the violence caused by the actions of the other against the self was seen on the actors who spontaneously defended the honor of Kiais. Meanwhile, the construction of thought in the perspective of Derrida (1997) who saw violence action originating from the self against the other was found on the perpetrators who wanted to preserve the identity of religious group. Construction of thought of other actors in the political-religious violence is between Berger and Derrida's perspectives.

In Berger's perspective, the issue of political-religious violence is associated with other issues which are understood as the other. The resulting tendency seeks to formulate political-religious violence as intrusion of opposing groups (both actors, groups of actors or structures) with which someone is identifiable. In short, the political-religious violence is widely understood as a violation by the other. Meanwhile, in the context of self-determination, there is no other

option for the self to act destroying the other. The idea of destroying the other is a goal which can and must be implemented unconditionally. This has become the justification of the perpetrators of political-religious violence according to Berger's perspective.

On the other side, the perspective of Derrida stated that political-religious violence is not an exclusive characteristic of the other. However, on the contrary, the political-religious violence is a means whereby the self (actors, groups of actors, or structures) is formed and maintained. This does not mean that the other is considered purely without political-religious violence, or merely as a reversal of the self and the other having been established to meet the rules of radical deconstruction.

In reality, the political-religious violence can take place from the self to the other, or from the other to the self, because the political-religious violence comes off in an effort to explain the in-group and out-group which separate the self from the other. Thus,

the political-religious violence can no longer be considered to simply impinge the victims from the outside, but otherwise the political-religious violence is associated with which is suspected as the other, that is, the self which is "sacred".

Such construction of thought is not always expressed in political-religious violence. There are prerequisites which must be met so that the construction of thought can proceed toward the acts of political-religious violence. In contrast to the construction of thought with quantitative parameters, such as economy which is more easily compromised, then the construction of thought with qualitative parameters, such as ethnicity, religion, and politics is more difficult to be compromised. The point of agreement of economic problems is more likely to be sought through bargaining process because its size is quantitative and clear. Meanwhile, the point of agreement of ethnicity, religion, and politics problems is difficult to be sought as public good for one community means to be public bad for other communities. As stated by Rabuskha and Shepsle that in a pluralistic

society, multi-ethnic coalition turns out to be unstable. Multi-ethnic cooperation can be raised only when facing with a common enemy, for example, facing invaders. However, after independence, ambiguity develops, where several national figures have consistently voiced multi-ethnic coalition, on the other hand, there are many political parties springing up voicing primordial ties to attract masses in General Election. The leaders of political parties are increasingly outspoken in shouting on the importance of ethnicity. This situation will get worse when the government is more concerned with the ethnicity of newcomers than the ethnicity of original inhabitants. The defeat which is felt by the ethnicity of majority original inhabitants by the ethnicity of minority newcomers leads to the decline of multi-ethnic coalition. Eventually, the breakdown of democratic procedures in the General Election (such as revocation of voting rights, manipulation of electoral rules and methods of representing them, electoral intrigue, etc.) is often accompanied by violence.

In the meantime, the researcher is impressed by the sincerity, firmness of faith and feelings of the rioters although the researcher also assumes that they were the perpetrators of political-religious violence. The researcher believes that the perpetrators of political-religious violence were hiding something when creating conditions which allowed the destruction of churches, as well as the researcher believes that he expresses the real feelings and that they remained consistent with those revealed in 1996. What disturbed their feelings and became the rationale so that the perpetrators used the way of political-religious violence were their partiality towards their own communities and their ignorance to the feelings of other communities.

Finally, was it true that Kiai's made serious efforts to prevent Saleh's case from being processed in court? Whereas, in the previous similar cases, they had always demanded that the perpetrators be processed in court. Could we believe that there had been drastic changes in the thinking of Kiai's. For those who did not believe would question: was the lie

with good reasons is told by the inventor to prevent the occurrence of further riot. Wasn't it reasonable if a family grudge which was constructed as a case of religious harassment in a remote area could be found, but the perpetrators of political-religious violence who ransacked Situbondo for a few hours before the military could not be found? The truth, missing central essence, seemed to be found if the authorities wanted it or at least the missing central essence could be authenticated by famous narrators of the truth.

However, we would say that there must have been a reality, a center, and the truth in the Sepuluh-Sepuluh Incident. Churches in Situbondo had been destroyed, and Christians in Situbondo, like anywhere in Indonesia, even in other countries felt disappointed and angry. The researcher himself met them and made judgments about them. All this was true, but the truth of the Sepuluh-Sepuluh Incident had not yet been revealed, had not been wanted yet by the authorities and had not been authenticated by famous narrators of the

truth. In the researcher's view, this study reveals only a small part of the truth from the Sepuluh-Sepuluh Incident, which is made up of more mysteries and many of which are not known by the researcher.[*]

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Surabaya Post
Surya
The Asian Wall Street Journal
The Jakarta Post
The Straits Times
The Sunday Times

Curriculum Vitae

Thomas Santoso was born in Bandung on September 6, 1959. He graduated from sociology department of social politics faculty of Airlangga University in Surabaya in 1984. In 1994 he graduated from a master program of social sciences in Airlangga University Surabaya. In 2002 he got his Ph. D. in social science, from the same university. He is now a professor in Petra Christian University in Surabaya. He also writes books and writes articles in journals.