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Intellectual Capital Disclosure, Information Asymmetry, Cost of Capital, and Firm Value: Empirical Studies on Indonesian Manufacturers

I, NADYA GOMES and Semuel, Hatane and Devie, (2019) Intellectual Capital Disclosure, Information Asymmetry, Cost of Capital, and Firm Value: Empirical Studies on Indonesian Manufacturers. PETRA INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BUSINESS STUDIES, 2 (1). pp. 27-35. ISSN e-ISSN 2621-6421

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    Abstract

    Signaling theory suggests that when high - quality entities signal their potentials such as intellectual capital to the market, its participants (e.g., investors) re - evaluate their worth and make informed decisions therefrom. This paper examines the consequences of intellectual capital disclosures with respect to firm value, information asymmetry, and cost of capital. Voluntary intellectual capital disclosure (ICD, measured in index) affects firm value (FV, measured in Tobin‟s Q) through reducing both information asymmetry (IA, measured in bid - ask spread) and cost of capital (COC, measured in weighted average cost of capital). 67 Indonesian manufacturers were purposively selected whose financial reports published in Indonesian Stock Exchange offici al website and Bloomberg provide the data for the research. A research model is estimated to the data through a partial least square analysis. Results provides substantial evidence on the positive effect of ICD on FV and negative effect on IA; negative eff ect of IA on FV; negative effect of COC on FV; and positive effect of IA on COC. On a separate analysis, IA is shown to significantly mediate the relationship between ICD and FV

    Item Type: Article
    Uncontrolled Keywords: Intellectual capital disclosure, information asymmetry, cost of capital, firm value
    Subjects: H Social Sciences
    Divisions: Graduate Program > Economic Management
    Depositing User: Admin
    Date Deposited: 29 Jul 2019 02:14
    Last Modified: 07 Aug 2019 18:35
    URI: https://repository.petra.ac.id/id/eprint/18342

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